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THE NEW YORKER
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
THE COMING WARS
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
What the
Pentagon can now do in secret.
Issue of 2005-01-24 and 31
Posted 2005-01-17
George W. Bush’s reëlection was not his only victory last fall.
The President and his national-security advisers have
consolidated control over the military and intelligence
communities’ strategic analyses and covert operations to a
degree unmatched since the rise of the post-Second World War
national-security state. Bush has an aggressive and ambitious
agenda for using that control—against the mullahs in Iran and
against targets in the ongoing war on terrorism—during his
second term. The C.I.A. will continue to be downgraded, and the
agency will increasingly serve, as one government consultant
with close ties to the Pentagon put it, as “facilitators” of
policy emanating from President Bush and Vice-President Dick
Cheney. This process is well under way.
Despite the deteriorating
security situation in Iraq, the Bush Administration has not
reconsidered its basic long-range policy goal in the Middle
East: the establishment of democracy throughout the region.
Bush’s reëlection is regarded within the Administration as
evidence of America’s support for his decision to go to war. It
has reaffirmed the position of the neoconservatives in the
Pentagon’s civilian leadership who advocated the invasion,
including Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
Douglas Feith, the Under-secretary for Policy. According to a
former high-level intelligence official, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after
the election and told them, in essence, that the naysayers had
been heard and the American people did not accept their message.
Rumsfeld added that America was committed to staying in Iraq and
that there would be no second-guessing.
“This is a war against
terrorism, and Iraq is just one campaign. The Bush
Administration is looking at this as a huge war zone,” the
former high-level intelligence official told me. “Next, we’re
going to have the Iranian campaign. We’ve declared war and the
bad guys, wherever they are, are the enemy. This is the last
hurrah—we’ve got four years, and want to come out of this saying
we won the war on terrorism.”
Bush and Cheney may have
set the policy, but it is Rumsfeld who has directed its
implementation and has absorbed much of the public criticism
when things went wrong—whether it was prisoner abuse in Abu
Ghraib or lack of sufficient armor plating for G.I.s’ vehicles
in Iraq. Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called
for Rumsfeld’s dismissal, and he is not widely admired inside
the military. Nonetheless, his reappointment as Defense
Secretary was never in doubt.
Rumsfeld will become even
more important during the second term. In interviews with past
and present intelligence and military officials, I was told that
the agenda had been determined before the Presidential election,
and much of it would be Rumsfeld’s responsibility. The war on
terrorism would be expanded, and effectively placed under the
Pentagon’s control. The President has signed a series of
findings and executive orders authorizing secret commando groups
and other Special Forces units to conduct covert operations
against suspected terrorist targets in as many as ten nations in
the Middle East and South Asia.
The President’s decision
enables Rumsfeld to run the operations off the books—free from
legal restrictions imposed on the C.I.A. Under current law, all
C.I.A. covert activities overseas must be authorized by a
Presidential finding and reported to the Senate and House
intelligence committees. (The laws were enacted after a series
of scandals in the nineteen-seventies involving C.I.A. domestic
spying and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders.) “The
Pentagon doesn’t feel obligated to report any of this to
Congress,” the former high-level intelligence official said.
“They don’t even call it ‘covert ops’—it’s too close to the
C.I.A. phrase. In their view, it’s ‘black reconnaissance.’
They’re not even going to tell the cincs”—the
regional American military commanders-in-chief. (The Defense
Department and the White House did not respond to requests for
comment on this story.)
In my interviews, I was
repeatedly told that the next strategic target was Iran.
“Everyone is saying, ‘You can’t be serious about targeting Iran.
Look at Iraq,’ ” the former intelligence official told me. “But
they say, ‘We’ve got some lessons learned—not militarily, but
how we did it politically. We’re not going to rely on agency
pissants.’ No loose ends, and that’s why the C.I.A. is out of
there.”

For more than a year,
France, Germany, Britain, and other countries in the European
Union have seen preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon as
a race against time—and against the Bush Administration. They
have been negotiating with the Iranian leadership to give up its
nuclear-weapons ambitions in exchange for economic aid and trade
benefits. Iran has agreed to temporarily halt its enrichment
programs, which generate fuel for nuclear power plants but also
could produce weapons-grade fissile material. (Iran claims that
such facilities are legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, or N.P.T., to which it is a signator, and that it has no
intention of building a bomb.) But the goal of the current round
of talks, which began in December in Brussels, is to persuade
Tehran to go further, and dismantle its machinery. Iran insists,
in return, that it needs to see some concrete benefits from the
Europeans—oil-production technology, heavy-industrial equipment,
and perhaps even permission to purchase a fleet of Airbuses.
(Iran has been denied access to technology and many goods owing
to sanctions.)
The Europeans have been
urging the Bush Administration to join in these negotiations.
The Administration has refused to do so. The civilian leadership
in the Pentagon has argued that no diplomatic progress on the
Iranian nuclear threat will take place unless there is a
credible threat of military action. “The neocons say
negotiations are a bad deal,” a senior official of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) told me. “And the
only thing the Iranians understand is pressure. And that they
also need to be whacked.”
The core problem is that
Iran has successfully hidden the extent of its nuclear program,
and its progress. Many Western intelligence agencies, including
those of the United States, believe that Iran is at least three
to five years away from a capability to independently produce
nuclear warheads—although its work on a missile-delivery system
is far more advanced. Iran is also widely believed by Western
intelligence agencies and the I.A.E.A. to have serious technical
problems with its weapons system, most notably in the production
of the hexafluoride gas needed to fabricate nuclear warheads.
A retired senior C.I.A.
official, one of many who left the agency recently, told me that
he was familiar with the assessments, and confirmed that Iran is
known to be having major difficulties in its weapons work. He
also acknowledged that the agency’s timetable for a nuclear Iran
matches the European estimates—assuming that Iran gets no
outside help. “The big wild card for us is that you don’t know
who is capable of filling in the missing parts for them,” the
recently retired official said. “North Korea? Pakistan? We don’t
know what parts are missing.”
One Western diplomat told
me that the Europeans believed they were in what he called a
“lose-lose position” as long as the United States refuses to get
involved. “France, Germany, and the U.K. cannot succeed alone,
and everybody knows it,” the diplomat said. “If the U.S. stays
outside, we don’t have enough leverage, and our effort will
collapse.” The alternative would be to go to the Security
Council, but any resolution imposing sanctions would likely be
vetoed by China or Russia, and then “the United Nations will be
blamed and the Americans will say, ‘The only solution is to
bomb.’ ”
A European Ambassador noted
that President Bush is scheduled to visit Europe in February,
and that there has been public talk from the White House about
improving the President’s relationship with America’s E.U.
allies. In that context, the Ambassador told me, “I’m puzzled by
the fact that the United States is not helping us in our
program. How can Washington maintain its stance without
seriously taking into account the weapons issue?”
The Israeli government is,
not surprisingly, skeptical of the European approach. Silvan
Shalom, the Foreign Minister, said in an interview last week in
Jerusalem,with another New Yorker
journalist, “I don’t like what’s happening. We were encouraged
at first when the Europeans got involved. For a long time, they
thought it was just Israel’s problem. But then they saw that the
[Iranian] missiles themselves were longer range and could reach
all of Europe, and they became very concerned. Their attitude
has been to use the carrot and the stick—but all we see so far
is the carrot.” He added, “If they can’t comply, Israel cannot
live with Iran having a nuclear bomb.”
In a recent essay, Patrick
Clawson, an Iran expert who is the deputy director of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (and a supporter of
the Administration), articulated the view that force, or the
threat of it, was a vital bargaining tool with Iran. Clawson
wrote that if Europe wanted coöperation with the Bush
Administration it “would do well to remind Iran that the
military option remains on the table.” He added that the
argument that the European negotiations hinged on Washington
looked like “a preëmptive excuse for the likely breakdown of the
E.U.-Iranian talks.” In a subsequent conversation with me,
Clawson suggested that, if some kind of military action was
inevitable, “it would be much more in Israel’s interest—and
Washington’s—to take covert action. The style of this
Administration is to use overwhelming force—‘shock and awe.’ But
we get only one bite of the apple.”
There are many military and
diplomatic experts who dispute the notion that military action,
on whatever scale, is the right approach. Shahram Chubin, an
Iranian scholar who is the director of research at the Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, told me, “It’s a fantasy to think
that there’s a good American or Israeli military option in
Iran.” He went on, “The Israeli view is that this is an
international problem. ‘You do it,’ they say to the West.
‘Otherwise, our Air Force will take care of it.’ ” In 1981, the
Israeli Air Force destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor, setting its
nuclear program back several years. But the situation now is
both more complex and more dangerous, Chubin said. The Osirak
bombing “drove the Iranian nuclear-weapons program underground,
to hardened, dispersed sites,” he said. “You can’t be sure after
an attack that you’ll get away with it. The U.S. and Israel
would not be certain whether all the sites had been hit, or how
quickly they’d be rebuilt. Meanwhile, they’d be waiting for an
Iranian counter-attack that could be military or terrorist or
diplomatic. Iran has long-range missiles and ties to Hezbollah,
which has drones—you can’t begin to think of what they’d do in
response.”
Chubin added that Iran
could also renounce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. “It’s
better to have them cheating within the system,” he said.
“Otherwise, as victims, Iran will walk away from the treaty and
inspections while the rest of the world watches the N.P.T.
unravel before their eyes.”

The Administration has been
conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran at least
since last summer. Much of the focus is on the accumulation of
intelligence and targeting information on Iranian nuclear,
chemical, and missile sites, both declared and suspected. The
goal is to identify and isolate three dozen, and perhaps more,
such targets that could be destroyed by precision strikes and
short-term commando raids. “The civilians in the Pentagon want
to go into Iran and destroy as much of the military
infrastructure as possible,” the government consultant with
close ties to the Pentagon told me.
Some of the missions
involve extraordinary coöperation. For example, the former
high-level intelligence official told me that an American
commando task force has been set up in South Asia and is now
working closely with a group of Pakistani scientists and
technicians who had dealt with Iranian counterparts. (In 2003,
the I.A.E.A. disclosed that Iran had been secretly receiving
nuclear technology from Pakistan for more than a decade, and had
withheld that information from inspectors.) The American task
force, aided by the information from Pakistan, has been
penetrating eastern Iran from Afghanistan in a hunt for
underground installations. The task-force members, or their
locally recruited agents, secreted remote detection
devices—known as sniffers—capable of sampling the atmosphere for
radioactive emissions and other evidence of nuclear-enrichment
programs.
Getting such evidence is a
pressing concern for the Bush Administration. The former
high-level intelligence official told me, “They don’t want to
make any W.M.D. intelligence mistakes, as in Iraq. The
Republicans can’t have two of those. There’s no education in the
second kick of a mule.” The official added that the government
of Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani President, has won a high
price for its coöperation—American assurance that Pakistan will
not have to hand over A. Q. Khan, known as the father of
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, to the I.A.E.A. or to any other
international authorities for questioning. For two decades, Khan
has been linked to a vast consortium of nuclear-black-market
activities. Last year, Musharraf professed to be shocked when
Khan, in the face of overwhelming evidence, “confessed” to his
activities. A few days later, Musharraf pardoned him, and so far
he has refused to allow the I.A.E.A. or American intelligence to
interview him. Khan is now said to be living under house arrest
in a villa in Islamabad. “It’s a deal—a trade-off,” the former
high-level intelligence official explained. “ ‘Tell us what you
know about Iran and we will let your A. Q. Khan guys go.’ It’s
the neoconservatives’ version of short-term gain at long-term
cost. They want to prove that Bush is the anti-terrorism guy who
can handle Iran and the nuclear threat, against the long-term
goal of eliminating the black market for nuclear proliferation.”
The agreement comes at a
time when Musharraf, according to a former high-level Pakistani
diplomat, has authorized the expansion of Pakistan’s
nuclear-weapons arsenal. “Pakistan still needs parts and
supplies, and needs to buy them in the clandestine market,” the
former diplomat said. “The U.S. has done nothing to stop it.”
There has also been close,
and largely unacknowledged, coöperation with Israel. The
government consultant with ties to the Pentagon said that the
Defense Department civilians, under the leadership of Douglas
Feith, have been working with Israeli planners and consultants
to develop and refine potential nuclear, chemical-weapons, and
missile targets inside Iran. (After Osirak, Iran situated many
of its nuclear sites in remote areas of the east, in an attempt
to keep them out of striking range of other countries,
especially Israel. Distance no longer lends such protection,
however: Israel has acquired three submarines capable of
launching cruise missiles and has equipped some of its aircraft
with additional fuel tanks, putting Israeli F-16I fighters
within the range of most Iranian targets.)
“They believe that about
three-quarters of the potential targets can be destroyed from
the air, and a quarter are too close to population centers, or
buried too deep, to be targeted,” the consultant said.
Inevitably, he added, some suspicious sites need to be checked
out by American or Israeli commando teams—in on-the-ground
surveillance—before being targeted.
The Pentagon’s contingency
plans for a broader invasion of Iran are also being updated.
Strategists at the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, in
Tampa, Florida, have been asked to revise the military’s war
plan, providing for a maximum ground and air invasion of Iran.
Updating the plan makes sense, whether or not the Administration
intends to act, because the geopolitics of the region have
changed dramatically in the last three years. Previously, an
American invasion force would have had to enter Iran by sea, by
way of the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman; now troops could
move in on the ground, from Afghanistan or Iraq. Commando units
and other assets could be introduced through new bases in the
Central Asian republics.
It is possible that some of
the American officials who talk about the need to eliminate
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure are doing so as part of a
propaganda campaign aimed at pressuring Iran to give up its
weapons planning. If so, the signals are not always clear.
President Bush, who after 9/11 famously depicted Iran as a
member of the “axis of evil,” is now publicly emphasizing the
need for diplomacy to run its course. “We don’t have much
leverage with the Iranians right now,” the President said at a
news conference late last year. “Diplomacy must be the first
choice, and always the first choice of an administration trying
to solve an issue of . . . nuclear armament. And we’ll continue
to press on diplomacy.”
In my interviews over the
past two months, I was given a much harsher view. The hawks in
the Administration believe that it will soon become clear that
the Europeans’ negotiated approach cannot succeed, and that at
that time the Administration will act. “We’re not dealing with a
set of National Security Council option papers here,” the former
high-level intelligence official told me. “They’ve already
passed that wicket. It’s not if
we’re going to do anything against Iran. They’re doing it.”
The immediate goals of the
attacks would be to destroy, or at least temporarily derail,
Iran’s ability to go nuclear. But there are other, equally
purposeful, motives at work. The government consultant told me
that the hawks in the Pentagon, in private discussions, have
been urging a limited attack on Iran because they believe it
could lead to a toppling of the religious leadership. “Within
the soul of Iran there is a struggle between secular
nationalists and reformers, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the fundamentalist Islamic movement,” the consultant told
me. “The minute the aura of invincibility which the mullahs
enjoy is shattered, and with it the ability to hoodwink the
West, the Iranian regime will collapse” —like the former
Communist regimes in Romania, East Germany, and the Soviet
Union. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz share that belief, he said.
“The idea that an American
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would produce a popular
uprising is extremely illinformed,” said Flynt Leverett, a
Middle East scholar who worked on the National Security Council
in the Bush Administration. “You have to understand that the
nuclear ambition in Iran is supported across the political
spectrum, and Iranians will perceive attacks on these sites as
attacks on their ambitions to be a major regional player and a
modern nation that’s technologically sophisticated.” Leverett,
who is now a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, at the Brookings Institution, warned that an American
attack, if it takes place, “will produce an Iranian backlash
against the United States and a rallying around the regime.”

Rumsfeld planned and
lobbied for more than two years before getting Presidential
authority, in a series of findings and executive orders, to use
military commandos for covert operations. One of his first steps
was bureaucratic: to shift control of an undercover unit, known
then as the Gray Fox (it has recently been given a new code
name), from the Army to the Special Operations Command (socom),
in Tampa. Gray Fox was formally assigned to
socom in July, 2002, at the
instigation of Rumsfeld’s office, which meant that the
undercover unit would have a single commander for administration
and operational deployment. Then, last fall, Rumsfeld’s ability
to deploy the commandos expanded. According to a Pentagon
consultant, an Execute Order on the Global War on Terrorism
(referred to throughout the government as
gwot) was issued at Rumsfeld’s
direction. The order specifically authorized the military “to
find and finish” terrorist targets, the consultant said. It
included a target list that cited Al Qaeda network members, Al
Qaeda senior leadership, and other high-value targets. The
consultant said that the order had been cleared throughout the
national-security bureaucracy in Washington.
In late November, 2004, the
Times reported that Bush had set up
an interagency group to study whether it “would best serve the
nation” to give the Pentagon complete control over the C.I.A.’s
own élite paramilitary unit, which has operated covertly in
trouble spots around the world for decades. The panel’s
conclusions, due in February, are foregone, in the view of many
former C.I.A. officers. “It seems like it’s going to happen,”
Howard Hart, who was chief of the C.I.A.’s Paramilitary
Operations Division before retiring in 1991, told me.
There was other evidence of
Pentagon encroachment. Two former C.I.A. clandestine officers,
Vince Cannistraro and Philip Giraldi, who publish
Intelligence Brief, a newsletter for
their business clients, reported last month on the existence of
a broad counter-terrorism Presidential finding that permitted
the Pentagon “to operate unilaterally in a number of countries
where there is a perception of a clear and evident terrorist
threat. . . . A number of the countries are friendly to the U.S.
and are major trading partners. Most have been cooperating in
the war on terrorism.” The two former officers listed some of
the countries—Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Malaysia. (I was
subsequently told by the former high-level intelligence official
that Tunisia is also on the list.)
Giraldi, who served three
years in military intelligence before joining the C.I.A., said
that he was troubled by the military’s expanded covert
assignment. “I don’t think they can handle the cover,” he told
me. “They’ve got to have a different mind-set. They’ve got to
handle new roles and get into foreign cultures and learn how
other people think. If you’re going into a village and shooting
people, it doesn’t matter,” Giraldi added. “But if you’re
running operations that involve finesse and sensitivity, the
military can’t do it. Which is why these kind of operations were
always run out of the agency.” I was told that many Special
Operations officers also have serious misgivings.
Rumsfeld and two of his key
deputies, Stephen Cambone, the Under-secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and Army Lieutenant General William G. (Jerry)
Boykin, will be part of the chain of command for the new
commando operations. Relevant members of the House and Senate
intelligence committees have been briefed on the Defense
Department’s expanded role in covert affairs, a Pentagon adviser
assured me, but he did not know how extensive the briefings had
been.
“I’m conflicted about the
idea of operating without congressional oversight,” the Pentagon
adviser said. “But I’ve been told that there will be oversight
down to the specific operation.” A second Pentagon adviser
agreed, with a significant caveat. “There are reporting
requirements,” he said. “But to execute the finding we don’t
have to go back and say, ‘We’re going here and there.’ No
nitty-gritty detail and no micromanagement.”
The legal questions about
the Pentagon’s right to conduct covert operations without
informing Congress have not been resolved. “It’s a very, very
gray area,” said Jeffrey H. Smith, a West Point graduate who
served as the C.I.A.’s general counsel in the
mid-nineteen-nineties. “Congress believes it voted to include
all such covert activities carried out by the armed forces. The
military says, ‘No, the things we’re doing are not intelligence
actions under the statute but necessary military steps
authorized by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to “prepare
the battlefield.” ’ ” Referring to his days at the C.I.A., Smith
added, “We were always careful not to use the armed forces in a
covert action without a Presidential finding. The Bush
Administration has taken a much more aggressive stance.”
In his conversation with
me, Smith emphasized that he was unaware of the military’s
current plans for expanding covert action. But he said,
“Congress has always worried that the Pentagon is going to get
us involved in some military misadventure that nobody knows
about.”
Under Rumsfeld’s new
approach, I was told, U.S. military operatives would be
permitted to pose abroad as corrupt foreign businessmen seeking
to buy contraband items that could be used in nuclear-weapons
systems. In some cases, according to the Pentagon advisers,
local citizens could be recruited and asked to join up with
guerrillas or terrorists. This could potentially involve
organizing and carrying out combat operations, or even terrorist
activities. Some operations will likely take place in nations in
which there is an American diplomatic mission, with an
Ambassador and a C.I.A. station chief, the Pentagon consultant
said. The Ambassador and the station chief would not necessarily
have a need to know, under the Pentagon’s current interpretation
of its reporting requirement.
The new rules will enable
the Special Forces community to set up what it calls “action
teams” in the target countries overseas which can be used to
find and eliminate terrorist organizations. “Do you remember the
right-wing execution squads in El Salvador?” the former
high-level intelligence official asked me, referring to the
military-led gangs that committed atrocities in the early
nineteen-eighties. “We founded them and we financed them,” he
said. “The objective now is to recruit locals in any area we
want. And we aren’t going to tell Congress about it.” A former
military officer, who has knowledge of the Pentagon’s commando
capabilities, said, “We’re going to be riding with the bad
boys.”
One of the rationales for
such tactics was spelled out in a series of articles by John
Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, and a consultant
on terrorism for the rand
corporation. “It takes a network to fight a network,” Arquilla
wrote in a recent article in the San Francisco
Chronicle:
When
conventional military operations and bombing failed to defeat
the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s, the British formed
teams of friendly Kikuyu tribesmen who went about pretending to
be terrorists. These “pseudo gangs,” as they were called,
swiftly threw the Mau Mau on the defensive, either by
befriending and then ambushing bands of fighters or by guiding
bombers to the terrorists’ camps. What worked in Kenya a
half-century ago has a wonderful chance of undermining trust and
recruitment among today’s terror networks. Forming new pseudo
gangs should not be difficult.
“If a confused young man
from Marin County can join up with Al Qaeda,” Arquilla wrote,
referring to John Walker Lindh, the twenty-year-old Californian
who was seized in Afghanistan, “think what professional
operatives might do.”
A few pilot covert
operations were conducted last year, one Pentagon adviser told
me, and a terrorist cell in Algeria was “rolled up” with
American help. The adviser was referring, apparently, to the
capture of Ammari Saifi, known as Abderrezak le Para, the head
of a North African terrorist network affiliated with Al Qaeda.
But at the end of the year there was no agreement within the
Defense Department about the rules of engagement. “The issue is
approval for the final authority,” the former high-level
intelligence official said. “Who gets to say ‘Get this’ or ‘Do
this’?”
A retired four-star general
said, “The basic concept has always been solid, but how do you
insure that the people doing it operate within the concept of
the law? This is pushing the edge of the envelope.” The general
added, “It’s the oversight. And you’re not going to get
Warner”—John Warner, of Virginia, the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee—“and those guys to exercise oversight.
This whole thing goes to the Fourth Deck.” He was referring to
the floor in the Pentagon where Rumsfeld and Cambone have their
offices.
“It’s a finesse to give
power to Rumsfeld—giving him the right to act swiftly,
decisively, and lethally,” the first Pentagon adviser told me.
“It’s a global free-fire zone.”
The
Pentagon has tried to work around the limits on covert
activities before. In the early nineteen-eighties, a covert Army
unit was set up and authorized to operate overseas with minimal
oversight. The results were disastrous. The Special Operations
program was initially known as Intelligence Support Activity, or
I.S.A., and was administered from a base near Washington (as
was, later, Gray Fox). It was established soon after the failed
rescue, in April, 1980, of the American hostages in Iran, who
were being held by revolutionary students after the Islamic
overthrow of the Shah’s regime. At first, the unit was kept
secret from many of the senior generals and civilian leaders in
the Pentagon, as well as from many members of Congress. It was
eventually deployed in the Reagan Administration’s war against
the Sandinista government, in Nicaragua. It was heavily
committed to supporting the Contras. By the mid-eighties,
however, the I.S.A.’s operations had been curtailed, and several
of its senior officers were courtmartialled following a series
of financial scandals, some involving arms deals. The affair was
known as “the Yellow Fruit scandal,” after the code name given
to one of the I.S.A.’s cover organizations—and in many ways the
group’s procedures laid the groundwork for the Iran-Contra
scandal.
Despite the controversy
surrounding Yellow Fruit, the I.S.A. was kept intact as an
undercover unit by the Army. “But we put so many restrictions on
it,” the second Pentagon adviser said. “In I.S.A., if you wanted
to travel fifty miles you had to get a special order. And there
were certain areas, such as Lebanon, where they could not go.”
The adviser acknowledged that the current operations are similar
to those two decades earlier, with similar risks—and, as he saw
it, similar reasons for taking the risks. “What drove them then,
in terms of Yellow Fruit, was that they had no intelligence on
Iran,” the adviser told me. “They had no knowledge of Tehran and
no people on the ground who could prepare the battle space.”
Rumsfeld’s decision to
revive this approach stemmed, once again, from a failure of
intelligence in the Middle East, the adviser said. The
Administration believed that the C.I.A. was unable, or
unwilling, to provide the military with the information it
needed to effectively challenge stateless terrorism. “One of the
big challenges was that we didn’t have Humint”—human
intelligence—“collection capabilities in areas where terrorists
existed,” the adviser told me. “Because the C.I.A. claimed to
have such a hold on Humint, the way to get around them, rather
than take them on, was to claim that the agency didn’t do Humint
to support Special Forces operations overseas. The C.I.A. fought
it.” Referring to Rumsfeld’s new authority for covert
operations, the first Pentagon adviser told me, “It’s not
empowering military intelligence. It’s emasculating the C.I.A.”
A former senior C.I.A.
officer depicted the agency’s eclipse as predictable. “For
years, the agency bent over backward to integrate and coördinate
with the Pentagon,” the former officer said. “We just caved and
caved and got what we deserved. It is a fact of life today that
the Pentagon is a five-hundred-pound gorilla and the C.I.A.
director is a chimpanzee.”
There was pressure from the
White House, too. A former C.I.A. clandestine-services officer
told me that, in the months after the resignation of the
agency’s director George Tenet, in June, 2004, the White House
began “coming down critically” on analysts in the C.I.A.’s
Directorate of Intelligence (D.I.) and demanded “to see more
support for the Administration’s political position.” Porter
Goss, Tenet’s successor, engaged in what the recently retired
C.I.A. official described as a “political purge” in the D.I.
Among the targets were a few senior analysts who were known to
write dissenting papers that had been forwarded to the White
House. The recently retired C.I.A. official said, “The White
House carefully reviewed the political analyses of the D.I. so
they could sort out the apostates from the true believers.” Some
senior analysts in the D.I. have turned in their
resignations—quietly, and without revealing the extent of the
disarray.

The White House solidified
its control over intelligence last month, when it forced
last-minute changes in the intelligence-reform bill. The
legislation, based substantially on recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, originally gave broad powers, including authority
over intelligence spending, to a new national-intelligence
director. (The Pentagon controls roughly eighty per cent of the
intelligence budget.) A reform bill passed in the Senate by a
vote of 96-2. Before the House voted, however, Bush, Cheney, and
Rumsfeld balked. The White House publicly supported the
legislation, but House Speaker Dennis Hastert refused to bring a
House version of the bill to the floor for a vote—ostensibly in
defiance of the President, though it was widely understood in
Congress that Hastert had been delegated to stall the bill.
After intense White House and Pentagon lobbying, the legislation
was rewritten. The bill that Congress approved sharply reduced
the new director’s power, in the name of permitting the
Secretary of Defense to maintain his “statutory
responsibilities.” Fred Kaplan, in the online magazine
Slate, described the real issues
behind Hastert’s action, quoting a congressional aide who
expressed amazement as White House lobbyists bashed the Senate
bill and came up “with all sorts of ludicrous reasons why it was
unacceptable.”
“Rummy’s plan was to get a
compromise in the bill in which the Pentagon keeps its marbles
and the C.I.A. loses theirs,” the former high-level intelligence
official told me. “Then all the pieces of the puzzle fall in
place. He gets authority for covert action that is not
attributable, the ability to directly task national-intelligence
assets”—including the many intelligence satellites that
constantly orbit the world.
“Rumsfeld will no longer
have to refer anything through the government’s intelligence
wringer,” the former official went on. “The intelligence system
was designed to put competing agencies in competition. What’s
missing will be the dynamic tension that insures everyone’s
priorities—in the C.I.A., the D.O.D., the F.B.I., and even the
Department of Homeland Security—are discussed. The most
insidious implication of the new system is that Rumsfeld no
longer has to tell people what he’s doing so they can ask, ‘Why
are you doing this?’ or ‘What are your priorities?’ Now he can
keep all of the mattress mice out of it.”  |