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1. The Jews have developed, under the
aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, a strong and
tightly-woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish
nonterritorial State with its own executive and legislative
organs, parallel in many respects to the Mandatory
Administration, and- serving as the concrete symbol of the
Jewish National Home. This Jewish shadow Government has
ceased to cooperate with the Administration in the
maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of
terrorism.
2. Quite apart from the increasing
strength of the terrorist gangs, which enjoy widespread
popular support, there are many signs that fanaticism and
nationalist propaganda are beginning to affect detrimentally
the Jewish educational system. It appears to us wholly
harmful that the obligatory period of one year's "national
service," instituted by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi,
is now partly used for military training. The "closing of
the ranks," moreover, which we noted above, has increased
that totalitarian tendencies to which a nationalist society
is always liable. To speak of a Jewish terror would be a
gross exaggeration. But there are disquieting indications
that illegal organization and the atmosphere of conspiracy,
which inevitably accompanies it, are having their corroding
effects on that free democracy which has always been the
pride of the Palestinian Jews. Every thoughtful Jew with
whom we talked was profoundly disturbed by these symptoms.
But none was bold enough to prophesy that they would
disappear so long as the Palestine Administration carried
out a policy which seems to every Jew to be in direct
contravention of his natural rights.
Jewish Relations With Arabs
3. Not only is the Jewish community
largely independent of and at odds with the Palestine
Government, but it is also quite distinct from and in
conflict with the Arab community with which, in many areas,
it is territorially intertwined. In part this is a natural
result of Zionist concentration upon the development of the
Jewish community. If the Arabs have benefited, they have
done so only in comparison with the non-Palestinian Arabs;
whereas they have remained far beneath the Palestinian Jews
in terms of national income, social services, education and
general standard of living. This has made it easier for the
Arab political leaders to keep alive anti-Jewish feeling in
the minds of the Arab masses. The economic gulf separating
Jew and Arab in Palestine has been widened, in part at
least, by Jewish policies concerning the nonemployment of
Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and
the refusal to devote Jewish funds and energies directly to
the improvement of Arab standards of living. Efforts by the
Jews in this direction might be quite as important for the
growth and security of the National Home as the draining of
swamp lands or the creation of Jewish industry.
4. But unfortunately there are signs of a
hardening of the Jewish attitude towards the Arabs. Too
often the Jew is content to refer to the indirect benefits
accruing to the Arabs from his comings and to leave the
matter there. Passionately loving every foot of Eretz
Israel, he finds it almost impossible to look at the issue
from the Arab point of view, and to realize the depth of
feeling aroused by his "invasion" of Palestine. He compares
his own achievements with the slow improvements made by the
Arab village, always to the disadvantage of the latter; and
forgets the enormous financial, educational and technical
advantages bestowed upon him by world Zionism. When
challenged on his relations with the Arabs, he is too often
content to point out the superficial friendliness of
everyday life in town and village- a friendliness which
indubitably exists. In so doing, he sometimes ignores the
deep political antagonism which inspires the whole Arab
community; or thinks that he has explained it away by
stating that it is the "result of self-seeking propaganda by
the rich effendi class."
5. It is not unfair to say that the
Jewish community in Palestine has never, as a community,
faced the problem of cooperation with the Arabs. It is, for
instance, significant that, in the Jewish Agency's proposal
for a Jewish State, the problem of handling a million and a
quarter Arabs is dealt with in the vaguest of generalities.
6. We noted, however, a few hopeful
signs. Reference was made above to the proposals for
cooperation with the Arabs made by Hashomer Hatzair and by
the Ihud group. The Committee observed with pleasure the
Arab-Jewish cooperation achieved on the Municipal Commission
which governs Haffa, and in the Citrus Control and Marketing
Boards, as well as the joint trade union activity between
Jew and Arab in the Palestine Potash Company and on the
railways. But such examples of cooperation are rare in
Palestine; and they are far outweighed in Arab eyes by the
exclusiveness of the General Federation of Jewish Labor in
its trade union policy and of the Jewish Agency in its labor
policy on land purchased for Jewish settlement.
The Jews and the Administration
7. We were profoundly impressed by the
very varied experiments in land settlement which we
inspected, ranging from individualist cooperatives to pure
collectivist communities. Here, indeed, is a miracle both of
physical achievement and of spiritual endeavor, which
justifies the dreams of those Jews and Gentiles who first
conceived the idea of the National Home. Of Jewish industry
in Palestine it is too early yet to speak with confidence.
There is boundless optimism and energy, great administrative
capacity, but a shortage of skilled labor and, as a result,
more quantity than quality of output.
8. As pioneers in Palestine the Jews have
a record of which they can be proud. In Palestine there has
been no expulsion of the indigenous population, and
exploitation of cheap Arab labor has been vigorously opposed
as inconsistent with Zionism. The failing of Palestinian
Jewry is a different one. The Jews have always been in the
biblical phrase a "peculiar people" which turned in on
itself and suffered the consequences of its peculiarity. In
Palestine, under the special conditions of the
Mandate, they have regained their national
self-confidence, but they have not been able to throw off
their exclusiveness and tendency to self-isolation.
9. We believe that this failure is, in
part at least, attributable to the relations between the
Palestine Administration and the Jewish community since
1939, which have undoubtedly exaggerated the natural Jewish
tendency to exclusiveness. Moreover, the Jews feel that they
have enough to do defending their own position, without
taking on the Arab problem as well.
10. A second factor of great importance
is the failure to develop self-governing institutions. The
Jews, like the Arabs, are completely deprived of all
responsible participation in central government. Their
democracy can only work within the Jewish community, and to
a limited degree in local affairs. Thus, they have not had
the opportunity which self-government brings, to learn the
lesson of responsibility for the good of the whole State.
They have been driven back on themselves. This may in part
explain the fact that at least one-third of the Jews who
have settled in Palestine during the last ten years have
failed to apply for Palestinian citizenship. But nothing
which we saw in Palestine gave us any reason to believe
that, charged with the democratic responsibilities for which
they are undoubtedly fit, the Jews of Palestine would not
master the lessons of self-government.
Arab Leadership
11. The Arabs are divided politically by
the personal bickerings of the leaders, which still center
round the differences of the Husseinis and their rivals; and
socially by the gap which separates the small upper class
from the mass of the peasants-a gap which the new
intelligentsia is not yet strong enough to bridge.
Consequently they have developed no such internal democracy
as have the Jews. That their divisions have not been
overcome and a formally organized community developed is in
part the result of a less acutely self-conscious nationalism
than is found today among the Jews. It is, however, also the
outcome of a failure of political responsibility. The Arab
leaders, rejecting what they regard as a subordinate status
in the Palestinian State, and viewing themselves as the
proper heirs of the Mandatory Administration, have refused
to develop a self-governing Arab community parallel to that
of the Jews. Nor, so far, have they been prepared to see
their position called in question by such democratic forms
as elections for the Arab Higher Committee, or the formation
of popularly based political parties. This failure is
recognized by the new intelligentsia which, however, is
unlikely to exercise much power until it has the backing of
a larger middle class.
Need for Arab Education
12. Many Arabs are graduates of the
American University at Beirut; a few have studied in
universities in Cairo, England, Europe and the United
States; others have received higher education at the Arab
College for men and the Women's Training College in
Jerusalem, both of which are efficient but inadequately
financed Government institutions. The Arabs are aware of
Western civilization and increasingly eager to share its
benefits. But the numbers receiving such education are still
miserably small, since the only university in Palestine, the
Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, teaches only in Hebrew.
So, too, with secondary education. There are only some
fifteen Arab secondary schools in the whole of Palestine,
and one fully developed agricultural school-the Kadoorie
School at Tulkarm which specializes in the training of
teachers of agriculture for Arab schools. With only 65
places, however, it too is totally inadequate. The problem
of teaching modern methods of agriculture to a population 80
per cent of which gains its living by farming has not yet
been solved by the Government, or faced by the Arab
politicians. Facilities for technical education are no
better-a single school with some 60 places.
13. On the primary level the position is
slightly better. The schools are under the control of the
Administration and financed by public funds. As far as it
goes, the primary education is well planned and
administered. It is not merely a bookish education, but
includes also manual training and instruction in
agriculture, where the equipment is available. Some of the
school wardens which surround the schools in the Arab
villages are models of neatness and skill. But the fact
remains that something less than half the Arab children who
would like to attend school can do so today. Even in a
wealthy town like Haifa, we were told by the Municipal
Commission that half the Arab boys and the majority of the
Arab girls receive no education at all. In most of the
country districts the situation is still worse, particularly
with regard to the girls. Only one Arab girl in eight
receives any education.
14. This is all the more tragic since the
desire for education is now strong throughout the poorer
classes, not merely in the cities, but in almost every Arab
village. Indeed, some villages visited by the Committee had
either built their own schools completely from voluntary
subscriptions by the villagers or had contributed largely to
their cost on their own initiative.
15. The lamentable condition of Arab
education is a real cause for discontent. This discontent is
increased by the contrast with the opportunities offered to
the Jewish child. Jewish education in Palestine is financed
by the Jewish community and by the fees which Jewish parents
can afford to pay. Practically every Jewish Child has the
opportunity for primary education, and those who can afford
the fees have ample opportunity for technical, secondary and
university education in Palestine. The Government
contributes only a small per capita grant in aid and
exercises little control of the curriculum.
16. It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the time has come for the Arab community to
assume the same responsibility with regard to education as
the Jewish. With advice and financial aid from the
Government, and with a new sense of responsibility on the
part of the Arab leadership, compulsory education could, we
were informed, be introduced within the next ten years. This
is not only essential from an educational point of view;
there can be no real unity between a literate and an
illiterate population.
The Administration
17. Palestine is administered by
officials of the British Colonial Service. Subject to the
provisions of the
Mandate, all major decisions of policy are taken in
London as they would be for a Colonial territory. As Mr.
Churchill has said: "the suggestion that the High
Commissioner either has a policy of his own in
contradistinction to that of His Majesty's Government, or
that, if this were so, His Majesty's Government would permit
him to carry it out, would be foreign to all the traditions
of British Administration." Indeed, the Administration of
Palestine has probably less freedom of action than the
Administration of some less developed territories, simply
because the affairs of Palestine arouse more public
interest, are the subject of more questions in the House of
Commons, and must therefore be supervised more closely by
the responsible Minister.
18. While admitting this difficulty, we
must express the view that this system militates most
gravely against the chances of reconciliation between Jew
and Arab. A delicate situation-and the situation in
Palestine is always delicate-cannot be met successfully by
remote control. Within a general directive, the man on the
spot, like the general conducting the battle, must be given
the responsibility. If this is not done, the chance of
reconciling the interests of the National Home with those of
the Arabs of Palestine is small indeed.
19. In Palestine itself, we also found a
tendency to centralization which was criticized by the Peel
Commission but which is in part at least another inevitable
consequence of the dominant role of politics in the life of
the country. Since every administrative question, however
insignificant in itself, is liable to be transformed into a
political issue by one community or the other, there is a
natural tendency for every action to be carefully
scrutinized at the center. The slowness of the
Administration in dealing with matters not at first sight
political, against which complaint is often made, is partly
a result of this and partly of the fact that the Chief
Secretary, through whose hands all important business must
pass, is himself obliged to give much of his time to
conducting relations of a quasi-diplomatic character with
the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities.
20. Palestine is a unique country,
bearing no resemblance to most of the countries administered
by the British Colonial Service. It may be questioned
therefore whether an Administration of the Colonial type is
the ideal instrument for governing two peoples each of
which, in the absence of the other, would probably by now be
enjoying complete independence. On the other hand, it seems
difficult to foresee radical changes in the system so long
as the division between Arabs and Jews compels British
officials to assume so extensively a responsibility, and in
view of the fact that their actions must be accounted for
both to Parliament and to an international organization,
each responsive to a keenly interested public opinion.
21. What is not open to question is the
patience and loyalty to their task of the officials on whose
shoulders rests the main burden of this heavy
responsibility. We were impressed also by the generally high
standard of the district administration. It is difficult for
those who have not visited Palestine to imagine the tension
under which these officials-Arab and Jewish, as well as
British-are compelled to live and work. We were especially
impressed by the anxiety, loneliness and nervous strain to
which many police officials are unavoidably exposed. It also
seemed to us that the Civil Servants in Palestine were
subjected to an additional anxiety which we could not regard
as unavoidable or in the best interests of the country, as a
result of the generally and sometimes pitifully inadequate
salaries which they at present receive. |