The Tent

The Tent - Part One

By Jawad N. Adra

It seems that both the pro-government and opposition forces have finally agreed on an issue: the seizure of public properties for a political end; firstly, the tents of “freedom, sovereignty and independence” in Martyrs’ Square, and secondly, the tents of Hizbullah and the opposition in Riad al-Solh Square.

The pro-government forces have justified setting up tents in Martyrs’ Square during the rallies against the Syrian regime (and often its people), and now the opposition is justifying the tents in Riad al-Solh, rallying against Fouad Sanioura’s government (and often the West).

One can arguably justify setting up tents and holding sit-ins and rallies as a basic right and a form of temporary civil obedience to achieve a political end; but how can one explain the annexation of public land and facilities to realize financial gains and how can this be legitimized and considered as a revered symbol?

Since tents are the issue, let us see what Lisan al-Arab defines the word “Khayma”, the Arabic word for tent.

“Home or house… If it is not made with trees then it is a house…”

We, therefore, can consider that all encroachments on public land and facilities, regardless of their purpose, have become private properties. This means that Lebanon is already a large ‘privatized tent’.

The tent is barely standing, with helpless and hopeless Sheikhs. Perhaps, the “State” is just a logo to justify the real and solid tents of the ruling zu’ama. Their tents have been constructed with customs, traditions and wars, laws and decrees that were supposed to be temporary until the State is established. Events have shown that it is the State that is temporary and everything else is permanent.

This allegory extends to all Arab countries, with Muammar al-Gaddafi flaunting his tent around the world and receiving the praise of Nicolas Sarkozy and George W. Bush.

Let us take SOLIDERE as an example.

SOLIDERE extends over 2,200,000 square meters and encompasses many tents, beginning with the Serail, which has become the “Halal” of the “Sunni”, followed by more than 11 churches and mosques which are the property of confessions, excluding the “Shia’a” who have a Husseiniya in Zqaq al-Blat, at the “borders” of SOLIDERE, and who have recently acquired the Parliament in Rafik al-Hariri Square (previously known as Nejmeh Square); now the “Shia’a” and the “Sunni” can happily coexist.

Another tent is the BIEL tent. Originally built as a temporary structure to host the Francophone Summit in 2001, BIEL has expanded to become one of the largest maritime “private properties” in Lebanon.

We should not forget four other necessary (but not sufficient) tents for the sustainability of the country of tents: The Banks Street tent, the only street that remained intact during the civil war and was protected by all the forces of hell, the tent of the Council of Development and Reconstruction, the symbol of what was called the “march of Development and Reconstruction,” in addition to the Ministries of Finance and Telecommunications.

There is also another tent which SOLIDERE introduces as follows:

“At the crossing of Weygand and Foch Streets, the Municipality of Beirut is a civic and architectural landmark dating back to 1934. The building is neo-Mamluk style, also referred to as ‘Oriental’ or ‘Arab’ style, an expression used to designate various strands of Islamic revivalism used in public buildings to express regional identity.”

Identity? Let us see

History books tell us that Foch was a Marshall of France who oversaw the creation of “Greater Lebanon” tent in 1920 and held the ceremony of Germany’s surrender to France at the Versailles Palace. Weygand, on the other hand, was the French General who surrendered to Germany in World War II.

As for the Mamluks, let us not forget that they fought against the last remnants of “Frange” (the crusaders) in the Holy Land.

Weygand Street flows into Omar Daouk Street, where it is claimed that Ivana Trump has designed a ‘tower’, a few steps away from Abdel-Hamid Karameh and Sa’ad Zaghloul Streets, two anti-colonialism leaders.

Having said all of this, why should we be so impatient with any additional tents, especially when we see that SOLIDERE’s profits, exempted from taxes by laws and decrees, have reached more than $132,000,000 in 2006?

Therefore, one can acknowledge a forgotten tent for the “detainees” in Syria, located in Gebran Khalil Gebran Garden, facing the UN tent, which cost us around $8 million a year.

“In my father’s house are many mansions” but SOLIDERE could not house the Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine and Islamic ruins.

No Bronze Age, no Iron Age, no Tramway and not even a Tunbargi (horse-drawn carriage driver)…or a tent to remember the tens of thousands of people who disappeared at Lebanese militias’ checkpoints during the civil war.

It might be soul healing to us, the 12,000 investors and businessmen in SOLIDERE, when coming to this area, to remember Al-Borj Square (also known as Martyrs’ Square or Canon Square), Nejmeh Square and Bab Idris as they were, and to cherish the memory of more than 100,000 people who were here…

Top

The Tent - Part Two

I wonder when did one of “Ahlu as-Sunna” from North Lebanon discover the presence of “Shia’a” in Lebanon.

“Come back, don’t play with those “Matawla”⁽¹⁾,” a lady, who admired the Phalanges Party, said to a boy when he went out to play near a farmers’ hut in the coastal area of Batroun. Although she did not know that someday, her beloved Phalanges and their offspring, the Lebanese Forces, would forge an alliance with “Ahlu as-Sunna”, she felt that there was something “wrong” with those “Matawla”. On that day, the boy discovered what has been (and perhaps still) unseen by Arab regimes: the “Shia’a” were present in the Arab world and (Mon Dieu!) also in Lebanon! It was the year 1970.

Was it necessary to wait for the arrival of Al-Khomeini in 1979 to remember Ali bin Abi Taleb? Was it necessary for Bush to invade Iraq to discover that there are Shia’a there? And when will we finally acknowledge that there are Shia’a in the Arab (not Persian) Gulf?

Let us remember the glory of Saddam Hussein in his “Qadissiah”⁽²⁾ in 1980. During those days, the overwhelming majority of Arab regimes, excluding Syria, were for the war on Iran, claiming that “Persians” are a threat to the “Arab Nation”, while ignoring that Iran was more of a “Nation” than us, we, the Sheikhs of tents, who encouraged Saddam’s war and later celebrated his execution after having lamented the demise of the Shah, as if he were not “Persian”.

Let us remember Sharon when he invaded Beirut in 1982. What did the “Arab Nation” do about it? Nothing, only words… Al-Khomeini, on the other hand, announced at the time that he would send “volunteers” or soldiers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to “defend Lebanon” (and the South of course)⁽³⁾. And the miracle suddenly happens: did Iran and Iraq agree to forge peace? Of course not…Did the Syrian and Iraqi regimes agree to stop their petty and devastating war against each other? Definitely not…

The three found it convenient to agree that the Iranian Guard can fight as a “resistance” on behalf of the “Shia’a”, “Sunni”, “Arabs” and “Persians”. Ba’albek was the first stop.

Let us also remember the Syrian-Iraqi “cooperation” to facilitate the armed group’s road to Ba’albek despite the violent relationship between the two States. Apparently tents were then welcome in Ba’albek and not in Beirut or Tehran or Damascus, and certainly not in Washington.

Let us recall the Ta’if Conference in 1989 and its successive governments. At the time, a large part of South Lebanon was under occupation and the country was undergoing a painful recovery from a 15 year long civil war.

We decided that neither the South (although it is claimed as a “dear” part of Lebanon) nor the country itself were occupied. We believed Israel’s claim that only the “border fence” was occupied, ignoring that this “fence” encompassed 115 towns and villages. “Let the Shia’a liberate them if they want to,” we secretly said to ourselves.

We also decided that militia leaders (to say the least), who committed the ugliest crimes during the war, are the ones who would “lead the country toward a better future.” So we decided to “forget” and “deny” instead of “understanding”, “reconciling” and “forgiving”.

Lebanon, Syria, the Arab League, the United Nations or the “International Legitimacy” came up with a bright solution: Why don’t we “sublet” the “Resistance tent” to the Shia’a and the “Development and Reconstruction tent” to the Sunni?

As for secular parties, they can fulfill their dream of entering Parliament or the government, share the spoils and remember the days of Sana’a al-Muhaidly, Paula Abboud and Soha Beshara⁽⁴⁾.

Didn’t the “mastermind” and the players know that South Lebanon’s residents are “Shia’a” and that a monopoly over the Resistance would grant them and Iran power and control?

Didn’t the “mastermind” and the players know that when the Resistance is “Shia’a”, regardless of the circumstances, “Sunni” reactions would rain heavily in Lebanon and the Arab world and from and to Saudi Arabia?

Didn’t the “mastermind” and the players know that when Lebanon and ‘Anjar are violated, via ‘Anjar⁽⁵⁾, painful repercussions would pour into Syria and Lebanon?

Today, Hizbullah is facing many challenges:

_- “Should you want an open war, then an open war it shall be.” But why should we grant “them” what “they” want?

_- “The Islamic Resistance,” but why is it Islamic, not Arab or national? And how isn’t it Shia’a? Can the “Resistance tent” welcome the pictures of Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, Subhi Saleh, Raymond Eddeh, Gregoire Haddad, Antoun Sa’adeh, George Habash and Gamal Abdel-Nasser, for example, along with the pictures of Khamane’i and Ahmadinejad, although Lebanon would look definitely better without pictures or slogans? And after that and most importantly pictures of Gandhi and Nelson Mandela to pave the road towards new horizons. Are peaceful resistance and civil disobedience not an option ever? If not, why? And if yes, when?

The “mastermind” and the players can play well and score points, but visionaries would change the game.

(1) The word “Matawla” is commonly used as a pejorative appellation of the Shia’a confession.

(2) Around 630 A.D., the Arab Army defeated the Iranians in the war of Qadissiah.

(3) This represents the official beginning of Hizbullah in Lebanon

(4) Sana’a al-Muhaidly (Syrian Social Nationalist Party), Loula Abboud and Soha Beshara (Communist Party) “secular fighters” against the Israeli Army in 1985. Rivalries between Hizbullah and those parties continued until the latter dominated the scene.

(5) The former Syrian intelligence headquarters was located in the city of ‘Anjar which was visited regularly by Lebanese top politicians.

Top

The Tent - Part Three

What went in the mind of Sa’id Jumblat in 1860, when he was imprisoned at the Grand Serail, awaiting trial and being “persuaded” by the British to accuse Khorshid Pasha ⁽¹⁾ of instigating the massacres in the Chouf?

Proud and unremorseful, he wondered what he did wrong: Provoked by the Maronite Patriarch, pampered by the English and encouraged by the Ottomans, he stood up to the honor of the Druze and encouraged his sister, Nayfeh, to massacre the Maronites in Hasbaya, as well.

Would he testify against his “friend” Khorshid? Never! His honor would never allow it.

Would he ponder whether the English have sold him out? No. His vanity tells him otherwise.

Does he regret the death of thousands? Never! It was the Maronite Patriarch who started it.

Did he know that he was a little insignificant detail in a much greater scheme? Definitely not! He is the Master of Mukhtara.

His death, due to illness, came as a convenient exit for everyone concerned, including himself; but the chapter was never closed.

What went through the mind of Kamal Jumblat in 1975, when Lebanon was at the brink of a civil war?

“Yes, I am the Sovereign of Mukhtara (Palace)… the meaning of life lies in one being the master of his own self,” ⁽²⁾ says Kamal Jumblat.

“It is not me who started it; it is “them”, the Maronites, the Isolationists”. “They are immoral and always seek foreign protection.” ⁽³⁾

What went through the mind of Walid Jumblat in 2006, when he called Bashar al-Assad the “worst of beasts”, accused Hassan Nasrallah of being responsible for the explosions and raised the French flag in Mukhtara?

Again, “it is not me who started it, it is them.”

Once upon a time, there was an enemy called the “Maronites”; today it is the “Shia’a”, who are seeking foreign intervention from Iran.

It seems that Lebanese zu’ama raising foreign flags and pictures of kings and heads of foreign states has become a tradition in our society. This reminds us of the Lebanese during the FIFA World Cup, when they wave the flags of numerous countries.

Why do we do that? Is it to spite our neighbor or for jubilation? Or is it simply because the Lebanese football team did not make it to the World Cup?

How does the worship of the “I” influence one’s conduct?

We understand that once the “I” is unleashed, irrational behavior prevails.

So it is not about ideologies but about satisfying one’s personal interests and ambitions.

It is not about being a nation, but about the survival of the za’im.

This explains why our “alliances” are altered: we are with Syria because “Lebanon is part of Syria”; we are with Egypt because “it represents true Arabism”; we are with France because it is “the mother of Revolutions” and with England for being “the mother of Democracy.”

Today, we are against Iran because it is “Persian” and with the United States because it is the “Supreme Power and the protector of Democracy.”

Hence, raising a flag here and a slogan there does not necessarily infer a change of opinion, but seizure of opportunity with a total disregard of national interest.

Yes, I am “Sovereign”, even if I raise the flag of a foreign country.

Yes, I am a “citizen”, even if I raise the flag of Germany or Brazil to show my support to their football teams, and when I also raise the pictures of parliamentary candidates during the elections. But perhaps I am more honest to myself when it comes to football since I “buy” the flags, while I am usually “paid” to raise the pictures of politicians.

Yes, I am “free”; I am not a follower; it is the “Tent Law” that forces me to raise flags, slogans and pictures and fire in the air sometimes to express joy or sadness, while other times to kill.

It seems that none of “us” make mistakes. And if we ever do, they are “minor” and have extenuating circumstances; our mistakes might even reflect wisdom.

“Among our problems, as Druze, is the presence of an Israeli community in Israel. Those Druze are not faithful servants to Israel. But a Druze person is wise enough not to abandon his land when the occupier arrives…” “The Druze are rational people.”

“I personally believe that if others imitated the Druze rather than escape, we would have the problem of Israel,” ⁽⁴⁾ says Kamal Jumblat.

In other words, we dare to say that the Druze of Israel are wise at the same time, we describe the Maronites of Lebanon as “isolationists” and “impossible to live with.” ⁽⁵⁾

Yes, the Druze are “wise” and also “scared”.

This explains why 100,000 Druze voters claiming to seek “equal representation”, wish to acquire around 15% of Parliamentary seats, while Suleiman Franjieh, who won around 83,000 votes lost his seat in the 2005 elections.

Is it not ironic that of all people, it is Kamal Jumblat who acknowledged that the Shia’a were driven away by the Druze hundreds of years ago and now his son is publicly prohibiting the purchase of private land in the Chouf by the Shia’a?

When asked about the war, Walid Jumblat said: “Yes (war is a crime)…but who is responsible for all these wars?”

Exactly, who is responsible? Perhaps we should look for the answer in our own tent, before pointing the finger at others…

⁽¹⁾ Ottoman High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon

^(2-3-4-5) Kamal Joumblatt, “Pour le Liban”, Stock 1978

Top

The Tent - Part Four

The “history book” recounts that Druze-Maronite conflicts in 1860 broke out due to a quarrel between a Druze boy and his Maronite neighbor in the town of Beit Mery on August 30th 1859. As for the wars of the 1840s, the “history book” says that they started when a Maronite resident from Deir al-Qamar shot down a bird, a pigeon or a chicken in a field that belonged to the Nakad Family, on September 14th 1841. Several other stories also tell us on personal quarrels that developed into bloody wars.

Yes, we are taught to believe that rival zu’ama, whose grandsons contributed to this “history book”, are the ones who sought reconciliation, among ignorant people who fought for the simplest things.

This is how political and religious zu’ama deny and perpetuate their crimes.

Today, we visit the Maronite Tent. In an attempt to understand the wars of 1840s and 1860s, it is important to go back to the “Zumma System” (payment of taxes by Christians under the Shari’a law), which is not our subject today. Nonetheless, the main reason behind the conflicts between Druze and Maronites was undoubtedly foreign interference.

Maronite leaders supported the campaign of Mohammed Ali, fought with him and attacked the Druze fiercely in Mount Lebanon and Jabal al-Druze. The Patriarch at that time was supporting France, which was backing Egypt; on the other hand, England was backing the Druze, of course. Colonel Churchill said that, at the beginning of the 1840s, France paid to Patriarch Hobeish 20,000 Liras ⁽¹⁾ and encouraged him to buy weapons to fight the Druze. Colonel Rose, for his part, wrote that the Maronite Order and Bkirki were ready to launch a civil war in order to control the Mountain.

Once again, in 1860, France and England were in deep conflict and Al-Khazen Family had connections with England, and with the Ottomans through England. Patriarch Boulos Masa’ad despised them (perhaps because he was a peasant and they were aristocrats); “the Maronites thought that they were stronger than they actually are,” as Churchill says.

Haven’t the Maronite leaders learned any lessons from this?

Of course not! “France is our compassionate mother! Be proud Oh Lebanese!”

The Maronites have never been proud like the day when Gouraud declared Greater Lebanon in 1920.

At the time, they had three options: Mount Lebanon to maintain its geographical borders; the cities of Trablous, Saida and Sour, in addition to the four Qada’a, to be connected to it; Mount Lebanon to be attached to the Faysal’s Arab State, which had Damascus as capital.

We were told that Patriarch Houwayek chose the second option. Maronite zu’ama witnessed their golden age, and maintained their internal conflicts and foreign connections.

In the 1930s, under the patronage of Patriarch Arida and Bishop Mubarak and with the support of Maronite rival political forces, negotiations and agreements were made with the Jewish Agency to build a Christian State in Lebanon in parallel with the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine ⁽²⁾.

Born in Bsharreh, Patriarch Arida was not able to mend ties with the Christians of Zgharta.

Demonstrators in the North shouted:

“Patriarch Arida left us

Abdel-Hamid Karameh is our Patriarch!”

As for Emile Eddeh and Bechara al-Khoury, the former remained obedient to France and the latter to England.

Patriarch Me’ouchi, for his part, distinguished himself from his predecessors by attempting to strengthen ties with the Arabs, perhaps due to his disagreements with Camille Chamoun; and this is why demonstrators shouted:

“Crowds from the Mountain and the Coast

Want a Patriarch in Bkirki, not a Hajj!”

In 1975, Camille Chamoun and Pierre al-Gemayel told Raymond Eddeh that it was high time to build a Christian nation and this time “a neighboring country is with us.” When he asked them which country they were talking about, they told him, “Israel”.

Camille Chamoun, unlike other zu’ama, was very blunt when he met with Begin in the latter’s house in Jerusalem. He told him privately: “Forget the West Bank and Gaza; don’t make the same mistake we did.” He reminded him that the state of Greater Lebanon should not have encompassed North and South Lebanon and the Beqa’a. He went on to say that it wasn’t the Lebanese people’s choice. “The French forced us to add these areas,” he said. This was in 1978. ⁽³⁾

Perhaps facts told by Paul Indari, in his books “Hathihi Shahadati” (This is my testimony) and “Al-Jabal…Haqiqa la Tarham” (The Mountain…An unmerciful truth) ⁽⁴⁾ reflect the foreign role (in this case the Israeli role) in the country. Indari says that an Israeli officer once told a representative of the Lebanese Forces: “We will withdraw (from the Chouf) and you (Maronites and Druze) can kill each other.” Indari also presents a list of 117 Lebanese Forces militants who were killed in battles, the majority of whom died on September 4th and 5th 1983. He continues:

“No cross will be raised without a sword

And no sword will win without the cross!”

Let us contemplate these honest feelings of sufferings on one hand, and this alarming tendency for violence on the other.

Speaking of civil war, let us read what Regina Sneifer says in her book, “I laid down the arms” ⁽⁵⁾, when she went to visit Patriarch Sfeir in 1986:

“In a trembling voice, I tell him about those missing, the bodies balanced with weights in the sea. No words can be read on the face of Patriarch.

I continue my story, but I feel that my words perish in this cold scenery. A long silence follows ... before I understand that it is my time to leave.”

Indari quotes Charles Malek (his spiritual guide) as saying in Mar Moussa Monastery in al-Douar in July 1981: “I am perfectly sure of what historians in the universities of Freiburg…Oxford…and Harvard will write in 2030 about the civil war in Lebanon. They will say that war was mainly over the fate of free Christianity in Lebanon. Do we, free Christians, have a future in Lebanon?”

Yes, we all have a future, when we become secular citizens who believe in true democracy and do not fight over a chicken or a parliamentary or ministerial seat, hold a mass for France and name our streets after those who occupied Lebanon, starting with Gouraud, Foch and Clemenceau.

The fact remains that the Maronite zu’ama and clergy had a golden opportunity to build a state, but instead, they opted for pettiness.

⁽¹⁾ Affairs of Syria, London, Printed by Harrison and Sons

At that time, the daily wage of a farmer was 1.2 piaster, which means that 20,000 Liras is equivalent to millions of dollars nowadays.

⁽²⁾ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “My Enemy’s Enemy”, translated by Fadi Hammoud, Arabic Edition First Published in 1997

⁽³⁾ David Kimche, “The Last Option”, 1991

⁽⁴⁾ Paul Indari, former military official in the Lebanese Forces; he wrote “Hathihi Shahadati” (2006) and “Al-Jabal: Haqiqa la Tarham” (1999)

⁽⁵⁾ Regina Sneifer, “J’ai déposé les armes”, Paris 2006

Top

[ Back ] [ Home ] [ Up ] [ Next ]